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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT COVECREST PROPERTIES 
I 
THE SUBDIVIDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO A 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT. 
The City of West Jordan, Defendant-Respondent 
herein, contends that § 63-13-11 and § 63-30-13, Utah Code 
Ann., of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") are 
applicable and dispositive of the issues on appeal. Specifi-
cally, the City argues that the subdividers1 failure to file a 
notice of claim and to plead compliance with the notice 
requirements of the Act, renders their complaints fatally 
defective. 
However, in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City 
Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that equitable claims and a claim for refund of monies paid to 
a city under mistake or without authority of law, are exempt 
from the notice requirements of the Act. The Court said: 
The common law exception to governmental 
immunity pertaining to equitable claims 
has long been recognized in this 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 779. 
In addition, the Court held that the enactment of 
the Act has not eroded Utah's precedent; an equitable claim 
may be brought without the necessity of first presenting a 
claim for damages. Id. 780; also see Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145,1154 (Utah 1983). 
1 
Defendant cites Roosendahl Construction & Mining 
Corporation v. Holman, 503 P.2d 446 (Utah 1972), as authority 
for the proposition that where no notice of claim has been 
filed, the plaintiff's complaint is fatally defective. 
However, Roosendahl is distinguishable in that the case 
involved a tax, rather than an impact fee collected and 
retained without authority. The plaintiff in Roosendahl made 
a claim for damages against the Tax Commission, alleging that 
the Commission acted maliciously and arbitrarily in its 
actions and procedures. The Court held that the acts 
complained of fell within Section 63-30-10, of the Utah Code 
Ann, and because no notice of claim had been filed defendants 
were immune from suit. 
If the Court decides that the notice requirement 
should apply to the subdividers• claims, then it should 
similarly determine that the notice requirement was satisfied. 
The City received written notice of claim for, and on behalf 
of, all subdividers similarly situated. In addition, the Call 
suit provided notice to the City. Any additional notice would 
have been superfluous. The City has not been prejudiced. 
II 
WHEN DID THE SUBDIVIDERS1 CAUSE OF 
ACTION ACCRUE? 
The City argues that the subdividers1 cause of 
action arose at the time they paid impact fees to the City for 
2 
approval of subdivision development. However, the City fails 
to provide any legal precedent for such a proposition. The 
present lawsuit does not challenge the validity of the impact 
fee ordinance. If it did, perhaps a different statute of 
limitations would be applicable. In this case, the 
subdividers seek refunds of monies paid under an ordinance 
that was determined in 1986 to be invalid ab initio. The 
subdividers1 cause of action did not accrue before 1986. Any 
litigation before the Supreme Court's disposition of Call v. 
West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) would have required each 
subdivider to sue the City, and challenge the validity of the 
ordinance. Such a result would have been contrary to judicial 
economy, and may have produced different results. 
Ill 
WHICH STATUTE IS THE APPLICABLE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS? 
The applicable statute of limitations to the 
subdividers cause of action is Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-
25(1)(1989). The Statute provides for a four-year period of 
limitation in which to commence an action. 
In Ponderosa One v. Salt Lake City Sub. San. D., 
738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987) the Court held that the four-year 
limitations period for work, labor or services rendered was 
the appropriate limitation period in an action to recover 
sewer service charges. The plaintiffs in Ponderosa were 
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engaged in the construction business and had filed suit for 
recovery of a sewer connection fee charged by Salt Lake City 
on an apartment complex under construction. The case reached 
the Utah Supreme Court in the context of an appeal from 
summary judgment barring the plaintiff's action as untimely. 
The City argues that the subdividers causes of 
action are precluded by several other statutes of limitation. 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-31, provides a six-month statute of 
limitation for actions against officers for money paid to them 
under protest. The present lawsuit does not involve an action 
against an officer of the City. 
The City also claims that Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-
30, providing a one-year statute of limitations is applicable. 
However, that statute is directly applicable to claims that 
must be made in accordance with the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. The subdividers1 claims are exempt from the Act. 
The City claims that Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-26(2), 
is applicable, providing a three-year statute of limitation 
for the taking of personal property. However, if the Cityfs 
collection of impact fees became illegal in 1986, when the 
ordinance was determined to be void, then commencement of this 
lawsuit in 1987 was well within the statutory period of 
limitation. 
Finally, the City argues that Utah Code Ann., § 78-
12-25, providing a four-year statute of limitation, precludes 
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the subdividers1 action. Again, if the cause of action arose 
in 1986, when the ordinance was determined to be void, the 
lawsuits were timely filed. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE 
TOLLED. 
Should the Court determine that the subdividers1 
cause of action arose prior to 1986, the running of the 
statute of limitation should be tolled for the reasons set 
forth in Appellantfs initial brief. 
The City claims that the statute should not be 
tolled, because there is no precedent in this jurisdiction for 
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. 
The fact that Utah has not yet addressed the 
principles and application of the doctrine, do not lessen the 
compelling reasons for its consideration and application in 
the present lawsuit. The doctrine has been used to toll the 
statute of limitations for plaintiffs, pending the outcome of 
similar lawsuits. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 
U.S. 342, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944); Collier v. City 
of Pasadena, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (App. 1983); Donoghue v. 
Orange County. 828 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). 
The City claims to have been prejudiced by the 
filing of this lawsuit in 1987. However, the City does not 
show any factual basis, or evidence of prejudice. They simply 
5 
claim the right to have the case tried within a reasonable 
time of when the cause of action arose. (Respondent's Brief, 
pc 27) They further argue that they have a right to have the 
case tried before evidence is lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses are unavailable. fid.) However, the City fails to 
provide any factual basis, or evidence that any evidence has 
been lost, that any memories have faded, or that any witnesses 
are unavailable. 
Indeed, the City gathered all relevant evidence in 
connection with its defense of the Call case. R. 276-283. 
The City was placed in a position to fairly defend this 
action. Its own evidence, gathered in connection with Call, 
which was presented to the trial court, sets forth the amount 
of impact fees paid by Covecrest Properties, and refers to 
additional improvements that the City required be made by 
Covecrest under Ordinance No. 33. fid.) 
It is the City's own evidence, confirmed by the 
Affidavit of Gordon Walker, General Partner of Covecrest 
Properties, that constitutes the totality of evidence. There 
is no other evidence that is relevant to a determination of 
this matter, and there are no genuine issues of material fact. 
As the Court said in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City 
Corp., 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1987): "If the City obtained the 
money of another by mistake, or without authority of law, it 
is her duty to refund it " 565 P.2d 778, 779. 
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V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
SUBDIVIDERS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Finally, the City argues that there are numerous 
factual issues that preclude summary judgment in favor of the 
subdividers. The City claims that the "factually-intensive" 
defenses "ought to be obvious from the face of the pleadings." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 33). However, defendants are not 
permitted to rely on their pleadings in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e) states: 
When a motion for summary judgement is 
made... an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. 
Despite the City's claim, it failed to provide any 
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists, on the 
defenses of mistake, waiver, estoppel, or unjust enrichment. 
The subdividers performed discovery of the City, and no 
evidence was produced, giving rise to a genuine issue. Tr. 
20, R. 267-268, R. 258-260. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicable statute of limitation is Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-12-25, allowing a four-year period in which to 
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commence an action. The subdividers1 cause of action did not 
accrue until 1986, when the Court determined the ordinance to 
be void ab initio. 
The notice requirement of Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act is inapplicable to the subdividers1 claims. If 
notice was required, the Court should find that it was 
satisfied. 
Should the Court determine that the period of 
limitation began to run, prior to 1986, then justice and 
equity demand a finding that the statute was tolled. The City 
made a timely investigation of all relevant facts in 
connection with the Call case, and it has not been prejudiced 
by the filing of the present lawsuits. The subdividers1 right 
to a refund of money that was collected and retained without 
authority of law, should not be deemed forfeited. 
As the City has provided no factual basis to any of 
the equitable defenses that it has raised in the pleadings, 
summary judgment in favor of the subdividers would be proper 
and appropriate in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Covecrest Properties asks the Court to 
reverse the trial court's Order, Ruling, and Judgment in this 
matter, and to remand the case with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellants for refund of 
the impact fees they paid, with interest. In addition, 
Covecrest asks the Court to award costs to the Appellants, and 
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for such other and further relief as deemed just in the 
premises. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1990. 
MARTIN & BIGELOW, P.C. 
"MEL S. MARTIN 
Attorneys for 
Covecrest Properties 
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